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Summary
The Bush Administration is in the process of building new embassy facilities in
Baghdad.   An emergency supplemental appropriation (H.R. 1268/P.L. 109-13), which
included $592 million for embassy construction, was signed into law on May 11, 2005.
According to the Department of State, this funding is all that is needed for construction
of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.  Completion of the embassy is expected by the
summer of 2007.  Congress provided an additional $1,327.3 million  within the FY2006
emergency supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234, signed June 15, 2006) for mission
operations and reconstruction team support in Iraq. This report discusses reestablishing
normal diplomatic ties with Iraq and setting up the new embassy facilities and regional
teams.  It will be updated as information becomes available.
Background 
From July 17, 1979, when Saddam Hussein first came to power in Iraq, until just
prior to the beginning of Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, the United States had
full  diplomatic relations with Saddam Hussein’s government.  On January 12, 1991, four
days before Operation Desert Storm, the United States closed its embassy doors in
Baghdad.  At the time of its closing, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad maintained a staff of
approximately 50 and an annual budget of $3.5 million.  From 1991 until 2004, the
United States did not have diplomatic relations with Iraq.
With Saddam Hussein removed from power and the United States and its partners
militarily occupying  the country, the Bush Administration handed over government self-
rule to the Iraqis on June 28, 2004.  Part of the transition toward self-rule for Iraq is also
a transition for the United States from being a military occupier to reestablishing normal
diplomatic ties with an independent Iraq.
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Organizational Structure
The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad) has full authority for
the American presence in Iraq with two exceptions: 1 — military and security matters
which are under the authority of General George Casey, the U.S. Commander of the
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), and 2 — staff working for international organizations.
In areas where diplomacy, military, and/or security activities overlap, the Ambassador and
the U.S. commander continue cooperating to provide co-equal  authority regarding what’s
best for America and its interests in Iraq.
The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad is among the largest American embassies in both staff
size and budget. According to the State Department, the U.S. Mission in Baghdad is
staffed with about 1,000 Americans representing various U.S. government agencies and
between 200 and 300 direct hires and locally engaged staff (LES, formerly referred to as
foreign service nationals, or  FSN). 
Americans representing about 11 government agencies are providing the face of
America in the embassy and regional offices in Iraq.  The agencies include the
Departments of State (DOS), Defense (DOD), Agriculture (USDA), Commerce (DoC),
Homeland Security (DHS), Health and Human Services (HHS), Justice (DoJ), Labor
(DoL), Transportation (DoT), Treasury, and the Agency for International Development
(USAID).  Agencies that did not recommend staff for an Iraq presence include
Departments of Energy, the Interior, and Veterans Affairs, as well as NASA, Peace Corps,
Secret Service, and Social Security. 
The United States has a number of experts from the various agencies on the ground
in Iraq working as teams to determine such needs as security, skills, expenditures,
contracting and logistics, communications/ information technology, and real estate.  In
addition, the United States has consultants from the agencies working in an ongoing basis
with the various Iraqi ministries such as the Iraqi Health Ministry, Education Ministry,
Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Oil, etc. to help Iraq gain a strong foothold on democracy
and administrative skills.  (See the organizational chart, Figure 1, on page 5.)
Location, Security,  and the Role of U.S. Diplomatic Posts in Iraq
The State Department has been using three sites for embassy-related needs.  The sites
are the Chancery, formerly a Baathist residence which was later occupied by the U.S.
Army; the Annex (the Republican Palace) previously used by the CPA; and the
Ambassador’s residence, once occupied by Ambassadors Bremer and Negoponte.  The
U.S. government is not paying Iraq for the use of property and buildings, according to the
State Department.  The Iraqi government has reportedly requested that these facilities be
returned to it.  On October 31, 2004, the United States and Iraqi Ministry of Foreign
Affairs signed an agreement on diplomatic and consular property.  Among other things,
this agreement transferred to the United States title to a site for the new American
Embassy compound and future consulate sites in Basra and Mosul.  State’s Overseas
Buildings Operations (OBO) identified property for a New Embassy Compound (NEC)
on a site adjacent to the Tigris River in the Green Zone.  OBO has estimated that NEC can
be constructed by the summer of 2007 — within two years of receiving appropriations
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from Congress.  All consular affairs activities, trade promotion, and other diplomatic roles
will be conducted from Baghdad.
Regional teams are located in Mosul, Kirkuk, Basrah, and Hillah; each consists of
limited staff representing DOS, as well as other agencies and contractors in designated
locations.  Altogether, 46 people are spread among the regional offices. (See the map,
Figure 2, on page 6.)  Each regional team’s mission is primarily advising and
coordinating with local officials and interacting with citizens to better understand the
attitudes of the Iraqi people toward America.  Both in Baghdad and in the regional offices,
American Foreign Service Officers will be conducting public diplomacy — promoting
American values and policies in Iraq.
Beyond the official consulate posts in Iraq, the Department of State has Foreign
Service Officers embedded in major U.S. military commands located outside of Baghdad.
DOS and DOD civilian employees also are at these locations.  The State Department
reportedly plans on having a total of 50 personnel in the Iraq provinces, including
diplomatic security personnel.
Security is key to establishing diplomatic relations.  The current facilities used by
DOS in Baghdad have been subject to attacks, some of which have injured and killed
Americans.  According to the Department of State, Diplomatic Security (DS) has
responsibility for embassy security.  Overall security in the country, however, will
continue to be the responsibility of the commander of the multinational forces.  DOD and
contractors will continue to be major contributors to a secure atmosphere.  Regarding
funding of security activities, the Administration has determined that security for the
embassy will come from a combination of DOD’s budget, as well as State’s Diplomatic
Security funds.
Funding
According to the State Department,  preliminary funding estimates for construction
of the new embassy compound in Iraq were $1.2 billion, not including refurbishing and
securing interim buildings.  To date, Congress authorized $20 million (P.L. 108-287) for
housing and other expenses incurred prior to construction of the new compound in
Baghdad and $592 million (P.L. 109-13) for actual construction of the NEC on the 104-
acre site. Department of State officials say that the funding is sufficient and the NEC is
on track to being completed on time — by the summer of 2007.
In his FY2006 budget request, President Bush did not include funds for construction
of the U.S. Mission in Iraq.1  A week after submitting his FY2006 budget to Congress, the
President sent Congress an FY2005 emergency supplemental funding request.  Included
in the supplemental is more than $1.3 billion for the embassy in Iraq: $690 million for
logistical and security costs for the embassy in Baghdad and $658 million for construction
of the new embassy compound there.  Included in the latter are the costs of housing, a
power plant, enhanced security, and expedited (24-month) construction.
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In early February 2006, the Bush Administration requested $1,497 million in a
supplemental appropriation request to cover Iraq mission operations and security.
Congress provided $1,327.3 million in the FY2006 emergency supplemental
appropriation (P.L. 109-234, signed June 15, 2006) for the embassy in Iraq operations and
security within the diplomatic and consular programs account of the Department of State
budget.  
Congressional Responsibilities 
While conducting foreign policy is the prerogative of the President, Congress
maintains three important responsibilities with respect to U.S. foreign policy: 1)
confirmation of political appointees (held by the Senate), 2) appropriations, and 3)
oversight.   Congressional opportunities to have input on U.S. diplomatic relations with
Iraq and the embassy can occur within the nomination confirmation process, the annual
State Department appropriation legislation, and biennial foreign relations authorization.
 
The position of Ambassador to Iraq was initially filled by John Negroponte, who
served from May 2004 to March 2005.   On April 5, Secretary Rice announced President
Bush’s intention to nominate Zalmay Khalilzad (formerly the Ambassador to
Afghanistan) as the new U.S. Ambassador to Iraq;2 this appointment required Senate
confirmation.
Appropriations for the new U.S. Mission in Iraq have come from a variety of
sources.  To date, no funds for either the interim buildings or new embassy construction
have come from the regular appropriations process, according to the Department of State.
The initial phase of establishing the U.S. post in Baghdad involved the Administration
finding funds without specific appropriations for the embassy.  Subsequently, much of the
total required funding appeared in emergency supplemental requests, CPA funds, and
DOD appropriations rather than in the regular budget.  Many have had difficulty in
discerning exactly what the Administration has already received and what is still needed;
what has been spent and what is in the pipeline; what is available for operational activities
of the Mission versus activities related to construction of the new compound.  On March
16, 2005, the House passed an emergency supplemental appropriation (H.R. 1268).  The
bill included $592 million for Embassy Security, and Maintenance ($60 million less than
requested).  Congress provided an additional $1,327.3 million for Iraq mission operations
and security in the FY2006 emergency supplemental appropriations (P.L. 109-234).  
Oversight includes congressional monitoring of how the embassy represents
American foreign policy, cultural and commercial interests.  While the 108th Congress
was criticized in the media for doing too little oversight in general, and specifically with
transferring of supplemental funds from Afghanistan to Iraq, construction of the new
embassy in Iraq has been a high priority for some Members.  Congress can provide the
State Department with authority and direction to implement new programs or new
emphasis on existing programs, and can set reporting requirements on spending or
conducting such activities.  The success of the newly-constructed embassy may well affect
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* Management:  includes FMO, GSO, HR, IMO, MED, Maintenance
** DoS/DoD Team:  Legal Office:  2 DoS; 1 DoD; PAO:  7 DoS, 17 IRMO 3161 (other DoS Units)
*** 20 IRMO positions are Regional operations positions.  Does not include 10 Washington DC IRMO Office positions.
^ ^  Includes 23 Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).
~    9 REO/PRT positions are counted in the Embassy Security Section, as they are officially  based in Baghdad. AID, PCO, 
DCMA  authorized includes REO/SET staffing
Note 1: RCLO, USM, and PCO are pending NSDD-38 approvals for the position numbers listed above.
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Figure 2. Post June 30 Field Presence
Source: U.S. Department of State.
Note:
Provincial capitals: Dahuk, Irbil, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, Baqubah, Hillah, Kut, Samawah, Amarah,
Nasiriyah, Basrah
Areas with U.S. Mission Regional Teams: Mosul, Kirkuk, Hillah, Basrah
Areas with possible contractor presence: Mosul, Irbil, Tikrit, Baqubah, Ramadi, Karbala, Hillah, Najat,
Diwaniyah, Kut, Samawah, Basrah
